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Warren: Administrative Delay in Providing Hearings for Social Security Di

ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY IN PROVIDING
HEARINGS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
The problems in adjudicating social security disability claims
have slowed the administrative appeals process to a "glacial pace." 1
Claimants whose applications have been denied or whose benefits
have been terminated must often wait up to a year for a hearing before an administrative law judge. 2 Particularly disturbing about this
delay is that once the hearing is conducted, more than half of the
claimants are found eligible for disability benefits. 3 Thus, numerous
claimants are subjected to prolonged deprivation of benefits to
which they are legitimately entitled.
In a suit brought by disability claimants seeking to expedite
the appeals process, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a Second Circuit decision, White v. Mathews, 4 which ordered hearings5
and decisions within 120 days of the date the hearing is requested.
In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (the Secretary) had violated Title II of the
Social Security Act, 6 the Administrative Procedure Act, 7 and the

fifth amendment" by subjecting disability claimants to unreasonable
delays. While the district court sustained all three claims, 9 the
1. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 854 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46

U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
2. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-42 (1976); Caswell v. Califano, 435
F. Supp. 127 (D.Me. 1977).
3. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 858 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON THE DISABILITY INSURANCE

PROGRAM 1 (Comm. Print 1974).
4. 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27,

1978) (No. 77-866).
5. Id. The order provided a graduated compliance schedule in which the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (the Secretary) was required to reduce the
maximum delay between the filing of a petition for a hearing before an administrative law judge and the issuance of a final decision to 180 days by July 1, 1977; to 150
days by December 31, 1977; and, finally, to 120 days by July 1, 1978. This order,
affirmed by the court of appeals, is explained in detail in the district court opinion,
White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261-62 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
8.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

9. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
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court of appeals found adequate grounds for relief under the Social
Security Act and declined to consider the other two claims. 10
Although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in White,"

the problem of administrative delay has national dimensions, as
12
demonstrated by three other recent federal district court cases;

suits are likely to result in other districts. This note demonstrates
the validity of each of the three substantive claims. In addition, the
note will evaluate the equitable remedies available to a court and
their applicability to the situation at hand.
WHITE V. MATHEWS

The facts in White v. Mathews1 3 were undisputed. George

White had been totally disabled by cirrhosis of the liver and acute
pancreatitus and was receiving disability insurance benefits. 1 4 After
receiving a doctor's report and reexamining White's eligibility, the
Social Security Administration (SSA) terminated his benefits as of
January 31, 1974. Pursuant to the appeals process, White applied
to have his case reconsidered; however, on July 11, 1974, he was
informed that his application had been denied. 15 On July 29, 1974,

10. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W.
3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
11. Califano v. White, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
12. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (D. Me. 1977); Barnett v. Mathews,
No. 74-270 (D. Vt. Feb. 22, 1977); Blankenship v. Mathews, [Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977
Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 14,739 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
13. 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27,
1978) (No. 77-866).
14. To establish initial entitlement to social security disability benefits and to
maintain one's right to continued benefits, a wage earner must demonstrate that he is
unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months ...
" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970). The disability must be of such severity that the applicant
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether
such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
15. Both an applicant whose initial application is denied and a recipient whose
benefits have been terminated may request a de novo reconsideration of the decision
and submit new evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909-.916 (1977). This redetermination is
based on a review of forms and affidavits, not on a face-to-face meeting with the
applicant.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/3

2

19781

Warren: Administrative Delay in Providing Hearings for Social Security Di
DISABILITY HEARINGS

White requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. 16
After waiting more than five months, White filed a class action suit
in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
17
against the delays in scheduling and completion of hearings.
White's hearing was not held until April 29, 1975, and the administrative law judge did not issue his final decision until May 21,
18
1975, more than ten months after White requested a hearing.
The delay at issue in White was the time between the claimant's request for a hearing before an administrative law judge and
the final decision rendered following that hearing. 19 The court found
this period to average 211.8 days for residents of Connecticut and
20
195.2 days nationally.
16. A claimant whose reconsideration is denied is entitled to a personal appearance and a full evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(b), 421(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917-.941 (1977).
17. "The class was certified as 'all potential Social Security Disability recipients, who have pending petitions for a hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge and have not had a hearing scheduled promptly and the matter concluded
within a reasonable time.'" White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 855 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977),

cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866). The class included
both individuals whose initial petitions for disability had been denied and individuals who were at one time declared disabled, but whose benefits had subsequently
been terminated.
18. The administrative law judge decided against White's claim. However,
White appealed to the Appeals Council of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals in the
Social Security Administration and won his claim, with the result that his benefits
were reinstated. See White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 n.3 (D. Conn. 1976),
aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27,
1978) (No. 77-866).
19. Other decisions have considered only the delay between the time when a
disability hearing is requested and when it is held. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp.
127 (D. Me. 1977); Barnett v. Mathews, No. 74-270 (D. Vt. Feb. 22, 1977) (delays in
hearings for disability benefits under Supplemental Security Income); Blankenship
v. Mathews, [Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 14,
739 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
20. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866). White v. Mathews, id., raises issues
of jurisdiction, mootness, and class certification which this note will not discuss.
Jurisdiction was grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1977), which gives district courts
original jurisdiction over mandamus actions. See White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp.
1252, 1258-59 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F. 2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866). The district court also suggested
that jurisdiction might exist under the Social Security Act, in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1970), see White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 n.36 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd,
559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No.
77-866), but the court of appeals found it unnecessary to consider this claim. See
White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 856 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W.
3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866). The recent Supreme Court decision, Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), held that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
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Violation of the Social Security Act
Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act 2 provides that when
the Secretary makes a decision adverse to a disability applicant,

such applicant may request and the Secretary shall provide "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such
decision .... -22 Since the reasonable period within which the Secretary must provide a hearing is not expressly defined by section
205(b), an application of this statute requires a determination of
who should decide what is reasonable, that is, justiciability, and how
reasonableness should be defined.
Justiciability
The Secretary presented several arguments demonstrating
why the court should not have made an independent determination
of what constitutes a reasonable time in which to process hearings.
First, the Secretary argued that since Congress considered the full
scope of the hearing delay problem in 1975 and passed remedial legislation, 23 the court should not interfere, but rather should permit
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976) (the APA), is not an independent grant of subject matter
jurisdiction to the district courts, thereby ruling out the APA as a basis for jurisdiction and casting doubt as to the existence of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1970), to review agency action such as that challenged here. See Caswell v.
Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D. Me. 1977).
The problems of mootness and class certification relate to the failure of the district court to certify the class until three months after White's hearing. The court
permitted the class certification to relate back to when White moved for certification,
five months before his hearing. See White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (D.

Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S.
Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp V. 1975).

22. Id. More fully, this section provides:
The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to
the rights of any individual applying for a payment under this subchapter.
Upon request by any such individual .. .who makes a showing in writing

that his or her rights may be prejudiced by any decision the Secretary has
rendered, he shall give such applicant.., reasonable notice and opportunity
for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, if a hearing is held, shall,
on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse
his findings of fact and such decision.
Id.
23. Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-202, 89 Stat. 1135. This law authorized
greater flexibility by the Social Security Administration in using hearing officers interchangeably among 'officers hearing cases mandated by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385
(Supp. V 1975) (Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and Disabled); 30
U.S.C. §§ 901-902, 921-925, 931-941 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (black lung benefits); 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
insurance benefits).
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these corrective steps to run their full course. 2 4 In addition, it was
argued that since Congress had previously considered but had
elected not to impose specific time limits, the court should defer to
the discretion Congress left in the Secretary to define reasonableness. 2 5 Moreover, the Secretary feared that if suits such as White
were to succeed, the various federal district courts might each define a reasonable time differently, depending on the circumstances
within their jurisdictions, thereby disrupting the uniformity of regulations in a national program. 26 In addition, since to meet a
court-imposed time limit in one district, the SSA might have to
transfer personnel from another district, the Secretary contended
that a delay might be created in the district from which personnel
27
are withdrawn.
Nevertheless, the court intervened and imposed a time limit.
It summarily concluded that despite the legislative history cited by
the Secretary, Congress never abandoned its requirement that
hearings be held within a reasonable time under section 205(b) of
the Social Security Act. 28 The court appeared to justify defining
reasonable in terms of a specific time limit by citing statements of
the Commissioner of the SSA. The Commissioner had reported to
Congress that hearings and final decisions could be rendered within
ninety days of receipt of requests for hearings by June 1977, if cer24. The Supreme Court took this position by deferring to Congress in
Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972). In Richardson the issue was whether

social security disability recipients were entitled to a pretermination hearing. Since
the Secretary of HEW had just adopted new regulations concerning the termination
procedure, the Court stated: "In the context of a comprehensive complex administrative program, the administrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to
evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise." Id. at 209. However, the Court did
consider this issue four years later in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
25. Prior to passage of the Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-202, 89 Stat. 1135,
Representative John F. Seiberling introduced H.R. 5276, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REC. H2134 (1975), and testified at congressional hearings, recommending
that Congress impose a 120-day-limit for hearing decisions, but Congress chose not
to include it in the final legislation. Delays in Social Security Appeals: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Delays in Appeals Hearings].
Subsequent to passage of the Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-202, 89 Stat. 1135,
Representative Seiberling continued to recommend imposing a 120-day-limit for
hearings as well as deadlines for the other stages of disability determination and
review. See Disability Insurance Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 342 (1976).
26. Brief for Appellant at 34, White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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tain remedial steps were taken. 29 The court inferred that since Congress took these remedial steps, 30 Congress expected hearings to
be held within such time.
While the court's conclusion appears sound, it can be criticized
for its logic. It can be argued persuasively that if Congress had
intended a time limit to be met, it would have included such a
limit in the legislation. A better way for the court to have refuted
the Secretary's justiciability arguments would have been to hold
that Public Law No. 94-20231 had run its course without alleviating
the problem of delay. The House described the legislation as the
"most effective action that can be taken immediately to help reduce
the enormous backlog of Social Security appeals cases new [sic]
pending within the Social Security Administration." 32 This was apparently intended as an immediate, short term remedy. In passing
Public Law No. 94-202, Congress expected that the backlog of appeals would be eased by June 1977, as the Commissioner predicted.
Since that time had passed and delays had persisted, it was appropriate for the court to ignore such legislative history and make an
independent determination of what constituted a reasonable time
period for administrative delay.
A number of unexpressed factors may have influenced the
court to review the time limitation issue. First, considering the
persistence of the problem of long delays and the high reversal rate
on appeal, the court may have viewed the SSA as generally inefficient. Consequently, the court may have been reluctant to rely on
the internal plans of the Agency to alleviate the long delays. Second, recognizing its function of resolving questions of law, the court
could appropriately have exercised unlimited review of the administrative Agency's decision when faced with the issue of statutory
construction presented in White. 3 3 In addition, given the court's
concern for separation of powers, it may have preferred to stretch
its interpretation of congressional intent regarding a statutory
29. See Delays in Appeals Hearings,supra note 25, at 74 (statement of James B.
Cardwell, Commissioner, Social Security Administration).
30. Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-202, 89 Stat. 1135.
31. Id.
32. H.R. REP. No. 679, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) (emphasis added).
33. The Supreme Court has stated that courts may exercise unlimited review of
an administrative agency's decision when presented with an issue of statutory construction. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (review of statutory
term "employees"); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (review of statutory term
"producer"). See also Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977)
(review of statutory term "employees").
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claim, rather than overturn the act on constitutional grounds. In
addition, while uniformity is an important concern, it is outweighed
by the court's obligation to grant relief when rights have been violated. Moreover, the court may have recognized the possibility of
either an appeal to the Supreme Court or congressional action to
create a national time limit for hearings. When these inarticulated
factors are considered, there is ample justification for the court's
decision to intervene.

Defining "Reasonable"
The Secretary asserted that while the delays suffered by the

claimants may be unreasonable in the abstract, they are not grievous in light of the burdensome circumstances causing the delays.
These causes were the size and complexity of the program, 34 the
huge backlog of pending hearings created by the time demands on
Social Security administrative law judges when hearing appeals in

other programs, 35 and the3 6 problems of recruiting and maintaining

administrative law judges.
While the court apparently recognized the difficulties inherent
in the administration of a massive government program such as the
SSA, it rejected the notion that inadequate resources can justify
34. In 1973, there were 1,024,500 initial disability claims decided and 53,100
hearings before administrative law judges. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON THE

DISABILITY

INSURANCE

PROGRAM 309-11 (Comm. Print 1974). The social security program is administered
jointly by state and federal agencies. Consequently, time is lost in transferring requests and records and in maintaining coordination. Whereas the initial determination of eligibility is made by the Secretary, see 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)-(b) (1970), the
hearing is conducted by an administrative law judge of the Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals. 20 C.F.R. § 404.921 (1977).
35. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C.
99 901-902, 921-925, 931-940 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), temporarily gave the Social
Security Administration jurisdiction to receive claims for black lung benefits. This
resulted in the use of Social Security administrative law judges in more than 17,000
black lung hearings. Delays in Appeals Hearings, supra note 25, at 38 (statement of
James B. Cardwell, Commissioner, Social Security Administration). Similarly, Social
Security administrative law judges were used temporarily to hear claims under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (Supp. V 1975) (Supplemental
Security Income for Aged, Blind, and Disabled), when that program became effective
on January 1, 1974. Thus, the backlog of pending hearing requests reached 113,000
in April 1975. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127, 130 (D. Me. 1977).
36. The Social Security Administration has had difficulty in recruiting and retaining administrative law judges because the Civil Service Commission classifies
them at a GS-15 pay level, while classifying comparable administrative law judges in
other programs at the higher GS-16 level. Delays in Appeals Hearings, supra note
25, at 186-214.
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what would otherwise constitute violation of a federal statute. 37
Although the court stated that "what is reasonable depends upon a
variety of circumstances,- 38 it failed to explain why staffing and
funding problems are inadequate justification. That Judge Feinberg
noted the "severe hardships that result from a wage-earner's disability ' 39 and the high reversal rate on appeal suggests that he employed a balancing test.40 Apparently, the court believed that the

administrative problems causing delays were insufficient justification when weighed against the severe hardship to disability applicants.
Courts have intervened in response to administrative delay
under circumstances that demonstrate that administrative problems
become a less valid reason for delay as the claimant's interests approach matters of basic human needs. Courts have required
prompt agency action regardless of administrative difficulties in
suits involving disability benefits under Supplemental Security Income, 41 essential services under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, 42 the issuance of emergency welfare checks, 43 and the
safety of using a drug. 44 In a commercial setting, when a corporation seeks to expedite an administrative proceeding, the courts
have shown more tolerance for administrative problems. 45 In such
cases, the courts have excused long delays when there did not appear to be any dilatory attitude on the part of the Agency 4 6 and
where the Agency was overburdened with a large caseload. 47 Accepting the proposition that "what is reasonable depends upon a
variety of circumstances," 48 such a balancing test offers a method of
37. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
38. Id. at 858.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Barnett v. Mathews, No. 74-270 (D. Vt. Feb. 22, 1977); Blankenship v.
Mathews, [Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)

14,739

(W.D. Ky. 1976).
42. Cornelius v. Minter, 395 F. Supp. 616 (D. Mass. 1974).
43. Adens v. Sailer, 312 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
44. American Pub. Health.Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972).
45. Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964). However, this does not indicate that all
delays in a commercial setting are necessarily reasonable. Compare Nader v. FCC,
520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975) with Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 313 F.
Supp. 105 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
46. FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964).
47. Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972).
48. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
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evaluating whether particular circumstances confronting an admin49
istrative agency justify such delays.
In concluding that the delays in White were unreasonable, the
court appeared to be influenced by a presumption that the hearings
process can in fact be expedited. The Commissioner's statement
that hearing decisions could be provided within ninety days by
50
June 1977 is quoted at length in the decision.
Ultimately, the court held that 120 days between the request
for a hearing and the final decision was a reasonable time and that
the average delays in Connecticut of 211.8 days violated the Social
Security Act. 51 In an apparent concession to the SSA for imposing
a rigid time limit, the court allowed thirty days more than the Administration's own projection. The court may also have been influenced by other federal district courts which, considering the
same issue, have required the hearing, not the final decision, to be
52
held within ninety days of request.
The standard imposed by the court is a lenient one. At the
very least, the SSA should be compelled to meet the ninety day
standard it set for itself. In the welfare area, the Supreme Court
found a statute permitting a twelve-day period between requests
and hearings to be unreasonable, and required a hearing prior to
termination of benefits. 53 The Court has not extended the requirement of pretermination hearings to disability recipients; it
drew a distinction between the degree of need of welfare recipients
and that of disability recipients. 54 This distinction is insignificant.
At the very least, the SSA should be required to process posttermination hearings within ninety days.
49. This balancing test also resembles the balancing of interests to determine
due process requirements. See text accompanying notes 79-94 infra. In Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized the factual difference
between business and welfare situations but did not apply differing constitutional
standards on that basis. Id. at 485. However, in Barnett v. Mathews, No. 74-270 (D.
Vt. Feb. 22, 1977), the court applied this distinction to a statutory standard of reasonableness in providing hearings for Supplemental Security Income disability benefits.
Id., slip op. at 12 n.10.
50. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 860 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
51. Id. at 852.
52. Barnett v. Mathews, No. 74-270 (D. Vt. Feb. 22, 1977) (delays in hearings
for disability benefits under Supplemental Security Income); Blankenship v.
Mathews, [Jan. 1976--Jan. 1977 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 14,739
(W.D. Ky. 1976). In addition, a case decided subsequent to White has applied the
90-day limit. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (D. Me. 1977).
53. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
54. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For a discussion of this distinction, see note 69 infra.
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Violation of the Administrative ProcedureAct
In finding a violation of the Social Security Act, the Second
Circuit in White found it unnecessary to consider whether the Secretary had violated the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA), 55
as held by the district court. 56 While the Supreme Court has never
explicitly held the APA applicable to the SSA, 57 federal courts of appeals have applied the APA frequently to determine if the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare has abused his discretion with
regard to social security disability determinations. 58
The provisions of the APA pertaining to hearing delays provide in pertinent part: "With due regard for the convenience and
necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it." 59 The APA also provides: "The reviewing court shall
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . .. "60
.

.

.

In addition to the district court in White, two other federal
district courts have held that delays in disability hearings violate
these provisions of the APA. 61 The APA standard compelling
agency action "within a reasonable time" 6 2 is essentially the same

as the "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing" requirement found in the Social Security Act. 63 Consequently, the analysis
and conclusions in applying this standard to delays in disability
hearings are identical to those previously discussed with regard to
the Social Security Act.64
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
56. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 861 n.12 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
57. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971).
58. See Ruiz-Olan v. HEW, 511 F.2d 1056, 1058 (1st Cir. 1975); Woods v.
Richardson, 465 F.2d 739, 741 (6th Cir. 1972); Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 617,
619-22 (6th Cir. 1972); Davis v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1972).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976).
60. Id. § 706(1).
61. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127, 133-34 (D. Me. 1977); Barnett v.
Mathews, No. 74-270 (D. Vt. Feb. 22, 1977).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. V 1975).
64. See text accompanying note 22 supra. In a recent, analogous case, Wright v,
Mathews, No. 75 C 1537 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1977), concerning delays in appeals hearings for applicants for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the court found violations of 42
U.S.C. § 405(a)-(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and of 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b)-(e), 706(1) (1976).
In addition, the court found the delays to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), which
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Violation of Due Process
As it did with the APA claim, the Second Circuit in White

refused to consider plaintiff's constitutional claim, and instead
based its holding on the Social Security Act violation. 65 This approach is consistent with the courts' policy of maintaining separation of powers by not overturning legislation as unconstitutional
when a claimant's interests may be adequately protected by a
statutory claim. 66 However, should the statutory claim fail, the
current delays in processing disability hearings appear to deny
claimants due process of law as protected by the fifth amendment.
To date, such a claim has been sustained by two federal district
courts, one of which is the district court in White.67
To analyze due process claims in this area, an understanding
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mathews v. Eldridge6 s is
necessary. At issue in Eldridge was whether due process entitled a
Social Security disability recipient to a hearing prior to termination
of benefits. The Supreme Court held that a disability recipient's

due process rights were adequately protected by existing pretermination procedures and the availability of a posttermination hearing. 6 9 But, as the district court in White concluded: "The Court in
provides: "The Secretary of ... Health, Education, and Welfare . . .shall make and

publish such rules and regulations ...as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which [he] is charged .... The court concluded that
the Secretary had violated his duty to establish regulations and procedures to enforce
a standard of promptness. Because the only notable difference between this case and
White is the OASDI benefits applied for, it is likely White could have succeeded
with a similar claim.
65. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 861 n.12 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
66. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
67. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D.Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978); Blankenship v.
Mathews, [Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 14,739
(W.D. Ky. 1976).
68. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
69. In so holding, the Court made factual distinctions between social security
disability recipients and welfare recipients: The latter group had previously been
found entitled to a pretermination hearing. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). The Court in Eldridge concluded that a disability determination, unlike a
welfare determination, could normally be made through an examination of medical
data without requiring a face-to-face hearing. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
343-44 (1976). In addition, the Court concluded that the degree of deprivation suffered by disability recipients was not as great as that of welfare recipients. Id. at
340-43. The validity of these distinctions, as well as of the Court's holding in general, has been criticized. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
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Eldridge did not rule . . .that termination of a disability recipients

benefits is altogether without constitutional significance; indeed,
the very opposite was held." 70 Delays in posttermination hearings,
while mentioned by the Court, 71 were not at issue in Eldridge.

The Court reasoned that delays in posttermination hearings, as well
as many other factors, do not create hardship sufficient to require
the addition of an expensive and elaborate pretermination hearing
procedure.72 Yet the Court was disturbed by the hardship caused
by delays in processing disability appeals. It described the administrative review process as "torpid" 73 and noted that " 'the possible
length of wrongful deprivation of ...benefits [also] is an important
factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests.' "74 These comments suggest that were the issue of the constitutionality of delays in the posttermination hearing procedure before the Court in Eldridge, it might have found such delays to be a
violatiQn of due process.
The Supreme Court has stated that social security disability
benefits are property entitlements subject to due process protection.75 Moreover, some form of hearing is required before an individual may finally be deprived of such a property interest.76 The Court
has maintained that the fundamental requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard " 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' "77 since "[p]roperty may be as effectively taken by
long-continued and unreasonable delay [as by affirmative action by
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of
a Theory of Value, 44 U. Ci. L. REV. 28 (1976); 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 672 (1976).
70. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 (D. Conn. 1976) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27,
1978) (No. 77-866).
71. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
72. Id. at 349.
73. See id. at 342.
74. Id. at 341 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975)) (brackets
in original).
75. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)). Cf.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (property right in employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (property right in welfare
benefits).
76. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (citing Anti-Fascist Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
77. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914)).
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the Agency]. "78
Eldridge is the Court's most recent standard for determining if
an administrative procedure assures due process. Balancing three
distinct factors constitutes the test:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that 79the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Both federal district courts that found disability hearing delays
to violate due process guarantees applied this standard. 80 As will
be demonstrated, the significant factual distinctions between the
issue posed in Eldridge and that posed in White make White a
more compelling case for due process protection.
Private Interests Affected
The Court in Eldridge recognized that in light of the typically
modest resources of the family of a physically disabled worker,
those recipients whose benefits are erroneously terminated suffer a
significant hardship by long delays prior to a hearing. 8 ' But since
the Court was focusing on the entire procedural system, it gave
consideration to the 3.3% reversal rate of all disability determinations.8 2 By contrast, plaintiff's class in White constituted only disability claimants who requested a hearing before an administrative
law judge; among them, the reversal rate was 51.6%.83 Stating this
78.

Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926). See Perez v.

Lavine, 378 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
79. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
80. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No.
77-866); Blankenship v. Mathews, [Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL.
INS. REP. (CCH) 14,739 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
81. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
82. Id. at 346.
83. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 n.12 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No.
77-866). The reversal rate in Blankenship v. Mathews, [Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977 Transfer
14,739 (W.D. Ky. 1976), was an even higher
Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)
67%. Id. at 2499-60. This high reversal rate may be attributed to a number of unsubstantiated explanations. The most obvious conclusion is that the initial determina-
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distinction another way, more than half of the plaintiffs in White
were totally disabled while their appeals were pending six to seven
months, yet they received no benefits. The significance of this
error rate is crucial in that it illustrates the considerable number of
persons erroneously deprived of benefits and magnifies the need
for speedier review to prevent prolonged deprivation. While claimants are entitled to retroactive payments if they are ultimately
found eligible, 84 this does not relieve the burdens suffered while
awaiting a hearing. 85 It is little consolation to know that one might
be paid in seven months when he is in need today.
The Court in Eldridge suggested that those workers who are
actually disabled may seek support from various welfare programs
during the interim period. 86 However, eligibility under other programs is not assured. The physical disability standard for Supplemental Security Income 87 is identical to that for social security disability. 88 Assuming that other forms of general relief are available
to the disability claimant, he may receive less than he is entitled to
under the social security plan. Finally, this alternative exposes the
applicant to the kind of humiliation and public scorn of "asking for
a handout" that the SSA, as an insurance program, was designed to
prevent.89
tions, made without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, are inaccurate. In
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), however, the Supreme Court felt that the
reversals could be explained by the open-file policy which permits an applicant to
submit new evidence concerning his disability after the initial determination of
eligibility is made. Id. at 346-47. The Court cited statistics as to how many applicants submitted new medical examinations on appeal, but there is no way of knowing how often such new evidence actually influenced the administrative law judge's
decision to reverse. Reversals might also be explained by the discrepancy between
the relatively specific written standards applied by state agency personnel in the
initial determination and the general statutory criteria applied individually by administrative law judges in appeal hearings. See Mashaw, sulra note 69, at 44.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1970).
85. Plaintiff White was forced to seek local relief while awaiting his hearing,
See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 860 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W,
3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
86. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1975).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)-(d)(2)(A) (1970).
89. In support of H.R. 7225, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), which Congress ultimately passed to create the disability insurance program, the Senate Finance Committee Minority Report stated:
Under a sound social-insurance program, Americans should be protected
against the fundamental hazards which would otherwise destroy their earning power and reduce them to beggary. Granted that some form of income is
necessary to provide for those who are unable to provide for themselves, it
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Erroneous Deprivation and Value of New Procedures
While the risk of erroneous deprivation to plaintiff's class exceeds fifty percent under current procedures, it appears unlikely
that expedition of the hearing process will substantially increase or
decrease the error rate. It may be argued that such expedition may
foster incorrect judgments in the interest of timeliness. Such concern is unfounded. The courts will not subordinate accuracy to
speed by defining due process as requiring a hearing within an
impossibly short time. A recent study of the delays in New York
concluded that such delays are largely attributable to nonproductive waiting time. 90 Surely such processes may be accelerated
while providing sufficient time for a just and accurate determination.
The Governnent's Interest
The government's interest is divided. On the one hand, the
government has an interest in properly serving its citizens by providing prompt adjudication. On the other hand, the government
must preserve its finite resources. While recognizing cost as a
legitimate government concern, the Supreme Court has frequently
held it not to justify denial of a constitutional right. 9 1
Without question, expediting the hearing process will increase
government costs. But the expenses would be significantly less
than those feared in Eldridge. Plaintiffs in Eldridge sought the addition of a pretermination hearing procedure to existing procedures.
Hence, the government would bear the expense of continued benefits until a hearing decision. In addition, the Court feared an increased demand for hearings merely to extend benefits tempo92
rarily.
is far preferable that these persons should remain proud, self-sufficient
Americans rather than become hat-in-hand pleaders for public charity.
S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 128, reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3877, 3942.
90. See P. Weitzman, M. Grilling, & A. Pitts, Delays in the Social Security Disability Claims Hearings Process in New York (Feb. 17, 1977) (unpublished report on
file at Legal Action Support Project, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.). This report cites unnecessarily long periods to perform relatively
simple processing tasks: 11 days to send the hearing request to the hearing office; 32
days for the hearing office to assemble the claimant's file; 44 days simply to assign
the case to an administrative law judge. Id.
91. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 266 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (state government).
92. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
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By contrast, plaintiffs in White did not seek any supplemental
procedures; rather, they sought to have existing procedures provided promptly. Moreover, the claimants in White did not request
that their benefits be paid continuously, but only that an appeal be
afforded within a reasonable time.
It is unlikely that a prompt hearing will induce a significant
increase in appeals. Considering the importance of disability benefits, most persons who feel they have a legitimate claim probably
appeal under the present system despite the hardship of delay.
Should the current delays in fact discourage claimants from exercising their right to appeal, this consequence hardly represents a proper government interest. Since the SSA has cited ninety days as a
realistic limit within which to hold and complete hearings, it appears entirely within the government's capabilities to do so. 9 3 As
the district court in White stated, the question of expense is
not whether there shall be costs incurred, but who shall bear
them while the governmental machinery responsible for providing appeals puts itself in order.
When the government does not act with reasonable
promptness, those claiming total disability are required to bear
an unreasonable delay and suffer unwarranted deprivation of that
94
which is lawfully theirs.
REMEDIES

Finding both statutory and constitutional violations, the district court in White established 120 days as a reasonable time
within which the SSA must hold a hearing and reach a decision. 95
The court sought to enforce this standard in a manner which takes
into account administrative difficulties, yet assures compliance.
The lower court's order, which was approved by the Second Circuit, provided: a graduated compliance schedule allowing the SSA
nearly two years to reduce delays to 120 days; exception to the
deadline when the delay is caused by the disability claimant; payment of prospective benefits as if the claimant were eligible when
hearing delays exceed time limits; and the right of the Secretary to
recoup such prospective benefits should the claimant be found in-

93. See Delays in Appeals Hearings,supra note 25.
94. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No.
77-866).

95. See id.
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eligible at his hearing.9 6
The federal courts are authorized to issue such an order pursuant either to their general equity powers or to the Administrative
Procedure Act. 9 7 Case law provides many examples where federal
courts have intervened and fashioned equitable remedies to prevent
harm to a claimant resulting from administrative delay. 98 Where
delays are interpreted to be constitutional violations, the Supreme
Court has inserted time limitations into statutory procedures to
avoid striking down the legislation.9 9
In White the granting of prospective benefits after the time
limit elapses assures compliance, while at the same time the order
meets objections to excessive exercise of remedial power. The Secretary argued that two sections of the Social Security Act prohibit
the court from ordering such payments. The Secretary maintained
that 42 U.S.C. § 405(q)100 allows expedited payments only under
specified circumstances, not including this situation, and that 42
U.S.C. § 405(i)101 allows actual payments only upon a final determination that the person is entitled to the payments. The court
10 2
correctly rejected these provisions as a bar to remedial action.
Any act providing benefits must contain sections which confine
payments only to eligible persons. These sections apply only to
situations where payments are due after an applicant has been determined eligible. The Social Security Act does not address the
issue of payments which are withheld by means of an unreasonable
delay in such a determination. In the absence of any such statutory
remedy, fairness requires that the courts have the flexibility to
10 3
fashion an equitable solution.
96. Id. at 1261-62.
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976).
98. See, e.g., Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 205-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (delay in
FCC consideration of issues relating to telephone rate increases); Deering Milliken,
Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961) (delay in lengthy NLRB hearings);
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960) (delay in
adjudication of employer's claim before Bureaii of Employees Compensation); Phillips v. Dawson, 393 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (delay in payment of unemployment compensation benefits); Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 313 F. Supp.
105 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (delay in employee request for review before NLRB).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971);
see also Sarkisian v. United States, 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1973).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 405(q) (1970).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 405(i) (Supp. V 1975).
102. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1978) (No. 77-866).
103. The Supreme Court has stated: "Once a right and violation have been
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While there is no evidence that the SSA has acted in a dilatory
manner, its performance record has been unsatisfactory. Despite
its assurances to Congress that the delays could be corrected by
June 1977,104 delays persist, suggesting the need for a remedy that

will either assure compliance with specific time limits or prevent
continued deprivation if such limits are not met. Prospective benefits have been granted in the analogous situation involving delays
in hearings following initial denial of welfare benefits. 10 5 Considering the graduated compliance schedule, the exceptions to the time
limits, and the right of recoupment, the order is neither rigid nor
harsh, but rather represents a fair balance of interests.
As alternatives to granting prospective payments, there are at
least two remedies to assure compliance with the court-ordered
deadlines. A less extreme measure was selected by two district
courts which considered essentially the same issue as was presented
in White.106 1t required the Secretary to provide the courts with periodic status reports detailing progress toward compliance with the
time limits. However, this solution appears ineffective as a means to
assure compliance. That the Secretary would be more inclined to
meet the deadlines because he is compelled to report to the court is
questionable. The reports merely inform the court of the Secretary's compliance. Even in the absence of such reports, the court
probably would be informed of the Secretary's inaction by the initiation of other suits for relief. In such a situation, the court would
likely resort to granting prospective payments anyway. It would
appear senseless to wait until additional claimants are wrongfully
deprived to issue such an order. Courts should bear in mind that
prospective benefits have only the potential of being paid. If the
Secretary complies with the time limits, none will be issued.
A more forceful remedy, adopted in Barnett v. Mathews, 10 7
is to make the prospective payments nonrefundable. Such a solution raises an important issue: "May the Court as an adjunct to its
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). See Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976).

104. See Delays in Appeals Hearings,supra note 25.
105. See Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
106. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (D. Me. 1977); Blankenship v.
Mathews, [Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 14,739
(W.D. Ky. 1976).
107. No. 74-270 (D. Vt. Feb. 22, 1977).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/3

18

19781

Warren: Administrative Delay in Providing Hearings for Social Security Di
DISABILITY HEARINGS

proper grant of equitable relief order auxiliary relief which has the
potential for requiring the disposition of sovereign property, despite the traditional immunity from relief which 'would expend it-

self on the public treasury or domain' ... ?"10
While the court in Barnett concluded that such relief is
proper, it stayed its order pending appeal. 10 9 The court reasoned

that potential payment of nonrefundable benefits is no more onerous than mandating expedited hearings, since speeding up the

process will presumably require expenditure of public funds. 110
Moreover, the court noted that the disability claimants bringing
the suit are not attacking the public treasury; they seek only to

have the appeals system proceed with reasonable promptness. The
nonrefundable benefits order is intended only to assure compliance

with the hearing time schedule.
The major significance of nonrefundable prospective payments
is an acknowledgment that the Secretary's authority to recoup wrongfully paid benefits is virtually meaningless. In most cases, the
108. Barnett v. Califano, No. 74-270, slip op. at 7 (D. Vt. July 11, 1977) (quoting
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)) (citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738
(1947)). The court noted a split among the courts of appeals regarding the scope of an
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The exception, as stated in Larson
v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), provides: "[W]here
the [federal] officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions." Id. at 689. However, the
Court limited this exception, stating that sovereign immunity would still be a bar
"if the relief requested can not be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the
conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the
disposition of unquestionably sovereign property." Id. at 691 n.11 (citation omitted).
The court in Barnett noted that the Seventh Circuit has held relief not to be barred
by Larson's footnote limitation unless it would work an intolerable burden on governmental functions, outweighing any private harm. Barnett v. Califano, No. 74-270,
slip op. at 6 (D. Vt. July 11, 1977) (citing Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 277-80 (7th
Cir. 1974)). The Second Circuit, however, adheres to a literal reading of the limitation.
Id. (citing Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415, 419-21 (2d Cir. 1971)). The court in Barnett also noted that if an action is brought under the APA for nonmonetary relief,
sovereign immunity is waived as a bar to equitable relief by the 1976 amendment to
the APA, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1976)).
109. Barnett v. Califano, No. 74-270, slip op. at 8-11 (D. Vt. July 11, 1977).
110. Id., slip op. at 7 (citing Shannon v. HUD, 387 F. Supp. 5, 8 (E.D. Pa.
1974)). Shannon involved a suit by residents of an urban renewal area. The Department of Housing and Urban Development was accused of improperly approving construction of an apartment complex. The court rejected arguments that it may be barred
from granting equitable relief because it may require the expenditure of funds. Sovereign immunity was held inapplicable when acts of a federal officer are challenged
as beyond statutory authority and when plaintiffs do not seek damages. Shannon
v. HUD, 387 F. Supp. 5, 7-8 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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claimant receiving the interim benefits would be indigent and would
spend the payments, making recovery impossible. In addition,
since in most instances the hearing is conducted not long after the
deadline has run, the amount paid would not be large. Consequently, the administrative and legal costs of attempting recovery
would probably exceed the amount sought.
CONCLUSION

One of Congress' primary objectives in delegating the power
of administrative adjudication to the various agencies was to mitigate the burdensome time obstacles usually present in litigation in
the courts. This objective is not achieved by the SSA hearings procedures. The damage caused by such delays transcends the deprivation suffered by individual claimants. A general loss of confidence
in the integrity and reliability of administrative procedures results,
expressing itself in the form of public cynicism regarding the
effectiveness of government. Ultimately, the culpability may rest
squarely on Congress, for it has the power to appropriate sufficient
funds and personnel to accomplish prompt administrative adjudication. In some circumstances, it may be preferable for the courts to
defer and permit Congress to find solutions for administrative problems. But the delays in the administrative determination of eligibility for social security disability payments is a situation uniquely
suited for judicial intervention. The deprivation suffered by claimants is of an unusually severe nature requiring prompt relief through
an equitable judicial solution. The granting of prospective benefits
serves both as an incentive to assure compliance with time limits for
hearings as well as a grant of relief to claimants should the time limits be violated.

Peter G. Warren
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